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Recent years have seen a large expansion in the use of rigorous impact evaluation tech-
niques. Increasingly, public administrations are collaborating with academic economists 
and other quantitative social scientists to apply such rigorous methods to the study of 
public finance. These developments allow for more reliable measurements of the effects 
of different policy options on the behavioral responses of citizens, firm owners, or pub-
lic officials. They can help decision makers in tax administrations, public procurement 
offices, and other public agencies design programs informed by well-founded evidence. 
This paper provides an introductory overview of the most frequently used impact eval-
uation methods. It is aimed at facilitating communication and collaboration between 
practitioners and academics by introducing key vocabulary and concepts used in rigor-
ous impact evaluation methods, starting with randomized controlled trials and compar-
ing them with other methods ranging from simple pre-post analysis to difference-in-
differences, matching estimations, and regression discontinuity designs.  
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1. Introduction 
Daily decisions made in public finance can affect the economy of an entire country. However, 
assessing the effectiveness of different policy options is challenging. Public officials are constantly con-
fronted with a myriad of important questions related to the impacts of public policy on the behavior of 
citizens, firms, or public officials. What policies are most effective against tax evasion? How strongly will 
firm owners react to tax incentives? How can monitoring be optimized to improve the behavior and com-
pliance of public procurement officials? What type of communication can motivate school officials to dis-
perse educational infrastructure grants promptly? How is the design of optimal policies affected by the 
behavioral biases that have been identified by the growing behavioral public economics literature (Chetty 
2015)?  
Recent improvements of impact evaluation techniques allow for increasingly reliable answers to 
these types of questions. A growing number of collaborations between public administrations and academ-
ics have facilitated the application of randomized evaluations and other quasi-experimental methods to 
questions of public finance and behavioral economics. In public economics, impact evaluations can often 
take advantage of already available administrative data, which considerably reduces their cost.  
There are various impact evaluation methods, each with different degrees of validity. The quality 
of the evaluation is of utmost importance for obtaining informative, unbiased results. This paper provides 
an overview of the most frequently used methods, in a language that is accessible both to academics and 
practitioners in public economics. It offers a brief summary of each method, its advantages and drawbacks, 
and the conditions under which the method produces valid results. In addition, it provides an introduction 
to key elements of the specialized terminology of impact evaluations in order to facilitate the communica-
tion between policymakers and academics looking to collaborate on these topics.  
It is, therefore, useful to define some basic concepts before presenting the specific methods below. 
The objective of every impact evaluation is to demonstrate a causal effect. The goal is to measure the 
impact of a program or policy on some outcome of interest. For example, what is the effect of a notification 
letter on tax payments? In the context of impact evaluations, the policy or program whose impact we want 
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to analyze is often referred to as the treatment. The impact is then the result that can be attributed directly 
to the treatment – such as a change in tax filings as a result of the notification letter.  
The fundamental challenge of impact evaluation is that at any given moment, it is only possible to 
observe what happened given the policies in place, not what would have occurred without those policies. It 
is possible to observe tax filings of taxpayers that received a notification, but it is not possible to observe 
what those same taxpayers would have done in the absence of such a notification. This imaginary situation 
of what would have happened in the absence of the treatment is called the counterfactual. Understanding 
the counterfactual is key to understanding the impact of a program. Figure 1 provides a graphical represen-
tation of this unobserved counterfactual.   
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 represents the fundamental challenge of impact evaluations, which seek to measure the 
difference between the outcome that in fact occurred (shown in light/yellow dots) and the counterfactual 
that is never observed (shown with dark dots). In this example, we can see that the primary outcome in-
creased more steeply after the intervention (light dots) than would have been the case without the interven-
tion (dark dots). The impact is measured as the difference between the outcome with the treatment and the 
outcome that would have happened without the treatment (the counterfactual).  
If an accurate representation of the counterfactual existed, then impact evaluation would be easy. 
The impact of a program or policy would be the difference between the result observed with the program 
and the result that would have prevailed without the program. Given that the counterfactual can never be 
observed in reality, each evaluation tries – in an explicit or implicit manner – to construct an estimate of 
the counterfactual to compare it to what occurred. The quality of that representation drives the quality of 
the impact evaluation. 
Normally, the counterfactual estimate is represented by a group called the control group or com-
parison group. The control group consists of people or firms that did not participate in the program, while 
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the treatment group is the group that participated in the program. To measure the impact of the intervention, 
the outcomes of the treatment group are compared with the outcomes for the control group. An evaluation 
will produce reliable results if the control group is identical to the treatment group in all its characteristics 
– observable or not – except one: their exposure to the treatment. In this case, any difference after the 
intervention can be attributed to the program. In the absence of treatment, both groups would be the same, 
so the control group constitutes a valid representation of the counterfactual.  
All methods used to construct the comparison group rely on assumptions under which the two 
groups would be comparable. When the assumptions are realistic, the control group is a good representation 
of the counterfactual. When these assumptions are not realistic, the resulting impact evaluation will be 
biased. That means it may over- or under-estimate the true effect.  A biased evaluation may result in poorly-
informed policy decisions and generate losses in terms of effort, time, and public resources. It is, therefore, 
important to use high-quality methods in order to obtain a reliable impact estimation, and to provide solid 
evidence for decision-making.  
Bias can stem from a variety of reasons that make the treatment and comparison groups different. 
Selection bias is produced when those selected into the treatment group are different from those in the 
comparison group in a way that affects outcomes. This happens also when people who choose to participate 
in a treatment are different from those who do not (self-selection). Bias can also come about when an 
external factor affects those in the treatment differently from those in the comparison group. This is some-
times referred to as omitted variable bias. It biases the conclusion that is reached by comparing the treated 
group to a comparison group that no longer represents a valid counterfactual.  
The focus on making the estimation accurate and unbiased is known as internal validity. Internal 
validity indicates the extent to which a causal conclusion based on a study is warranted, i.e., the extent to 
which a study avoids the risk of bias. Well-executed randomized evaluations have very high internal valid-
ity. Other methods described below have larger risks of bias, and consequently, lower internal validity. 
These will be discussed in more detail below.  
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In contrast, external validity refers to the extent to which the causal findings of a study can be 
generalized or extrapolated to other situations and settings. For instance, in the area of public economics, 
an external validity question could ask to what extent the findings of an evaluation in one region are in-
formative for a potential nation-wide rollout of a policy, or even for other countries or continents. External 
validity can to some degree be assessed based on specific knowledge of the setting in question, or one can 
explicitly test for it through replication of the same analysis in different settings. See Banerjee and Duflo 
(2009) and Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008) for a more in-depth discussion.  
The remainder of the paper discusses characteristics, strengths, and limitations of different evalua-
tion methods (for a more in-depth treatment of any of these methods, see, for example, Angrist and Pischke 
2009, 2015; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; and Gertler et al. 2011). Section 2 starts with randomized eval-
uations as the benchmark to which the other methods can be compared. Sections 3-4 discuss simple differ-
ence and simple pre-post analysis. These methods require the strongest assumptions and are most likely to 
yield biased results. Sections 5-6 present difference-in-differences analysis, matching procedures, and pro-
pensity scores. Depending on the setting, these methods can yield reliable impact estimations, but they have 
to be applied selectively and with great care to ensure their underlying assumptions are met.  Section 7 
provides an introduction to the regression discontinuity design. This method can, under certain circum-
stances, deliver causal estimates that are just as valid as those from randomized evaluations, with the caveat 
that they estimate the effect only for a specific subsection of the population. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Randomized Evaluation 
The goal of randomized evaluations – also called experimental evaluations, randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs), or randomized field experiments – is to create an ideal comparison group by 
design from the beginning of the intervention. Study participants, which can be individuals, firms, or entire 
public entities or localities, are randomly assigned to either receive the treatment or be in the comparison 
group. This random assignment ensures that (on average) there is no difference between the individuals in 
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the treatment and control group, except for the fact that one group has been randomly chosen to participate 
in the program and the other has not. We can therefore rule out that the impact measured is due to a 
systematic difference between the treatment and control group that would have existed even without the 
application of the treatment (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2008). Randomized evaluations are thus often 
seen as the ideal way to conduct an impact evaluation. It is for this reason that in the evaluation of new 
medicines and in natural science laboratory research, this method is used almost exclusively. (Note: It is 
important to distinguish between a randomized evaluation and a random sample. Random samples are used 
to obtain representative descriptive information about a population, not to measure impact. The distinctive 
characteristic of a randomized evaluation is that the treatment is assigned randomly.) 
Another benefit of randomized evaluations is that they allow researchers to identify the effect of a 
particular component of a larger program. To do so, one can vary one particular factor in a number of 
treatment groups and compare them to the control group. This way, the casual impact of a particular com-
ponent of a program or policy can be identified in a way that is difficult otherwise (Banerjee and Duflo 
2009). For instance, studies about what policies can improve access to education and school learning sought 
to measure the specific effects of textbooks (Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin 2009), class-size (Angrist and 
Lavy 1999), and student health (Miguel and Kremer 2004). Randomized evaluations that manipulate one 
factor at a time, while holding the other elements of the classroom environment constant, can measure the 
individual impact of each factor. This isolation of specific factors can make it possible to test particular 
mechanisms through which a policy has an effect (Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan 2011). 
Importantly, randomized assignment requires that the evaluation be designed before the program 
has begun. For this reason, this method is also called prospective evaluation. In a random process, 
individuals (or other entities like schools, firms, or villages) are assigned to the treatment group and those 
not selected are part of the control group. This generates two groups that are similar both in terms of ob-
servable characteristics (such as education levels) and unobservable ones (such as motivation). Therefore, 
any difference that arises later between the treatment and control groups can be attributed to the program 
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and not to other factors. For this reason, if designed and applied adequately, a randomized evaluation is the 
most valid method for measuring the impact of a program and requires the fewest additional assumptions. 
 
2.1 Randomization in practice 
This section will lay out a brief overview of the different steps involved in setting up and imple-
menting a randomized field study (for a more detailed description of the steps involved in randomized 
controlled trials under many different scenarios, see Glennerster and Takavarasha 2013, and Gerber and 
Green 2012). The first step is to choose a program, population, and main outcome variables of interest. 
Ideally, this will be a program that is of interest to the policymaker to the degree that learning about its 
effectiveness, or aspects of its effectiveness, will feed into the decision-making process of the public entity.   
Second, prior to starting the evaluation, it is useful to calculate statistical estimates to determine 
the size of the treatment and control groups required for reliably measuring the impact on outcome variables 
of interest. This analysis is called power calculation since it estimates how many observations are needed 
to have enough statistical power to detect a meaningful effect.   
How do we determine the number of participants required in a randomized study?  The greater the 
number of individuals included in a study, the more likely it is that both groups will be similar (due to the 
statistical “law of large numbers”). This is one of the reasons why sample size is important. A larger sample 
is better since it reduces the likelihood of having unbalanced groups. Moreover, a larger sample improves 
the precision of the impact estimates, i.e., it increases the likelihood of detecting the true impact of a pro-
gram. Nevertheless, a bigger study can be more costly and is not always feasible. Therefore, power calcu-
lations can help determine the sample size necessary for measuring the impact on the main outcome of 
interest. 
Statistical power calculations incorporate the different factors that affect the number of required 
participants. Among the factors to be considered are the variance of the outcome variable of interest and 
the minimum effect expected to be detected. The smaller the size of the effect one wishes to detect, the 
larger the number of observations needed. In addition, the higher the variance in the outcome of interest, 
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the larger the number of observations needed to distinguish the true effect size from simple noise in the 
data. Finally, the randomization design can affect the necessary group size. If the randomization is per-
formed at the group level (clustered randomization), more observations will be necessary than if the ran-
domization is done at the individual level (see more details on clustered randomization below.) 
The third step in a randomized evaluation is the random assignment of treatment. The 
randomization process can be as simple as tossing a coin or a conducting a lottery. To make the process 
transparent and replicable, the random assignment is often implemented using a statistical software such as 
Stata. It is important that the randomization process be truly random and not just “seemingly” arbitrary. For 
example, assigning the treatment to people whose surnames start with the letters “A-L” and leaving those 
starting with “M-Z” as control may seem random, but it is not. Such assignment requires the assumption 
that the individuals whose surnames start with the letters “A-L” are the same as those that start with “M-
Z”. However, it is possible that the families whose surnames start with the letters “A-L” are different from 
the families with a last name starting with the letters “M-Z”. For example, the ethnic composition may vary. 
To avoid this situation, an automated method such as using a computer program to generate random num-
bers that determine treatment assignment is recommended.   
A computer also simplifies more complex randomization processes, like stratified randomization. 
Stratified randomization is recommended when the number of potential participants is relatively small, to 
ensure that both groups are balanced with respect to the most important variables. In stratifying, the sample 
is divided into subgroups of similar characteristics, with participants within each subgroup randomized to 
treatment and control, such that the proportion in treatment and control is the same for each subgroup. For 
example, if the population is divided by gender, if thirty percent of men and thirty percent of women are 
assigned the treatment, this assignment will be perfectly balanced in terms of gender. The treatment group 
will have the exact same gender composition as the control group.  
As mentioned above, another often-used randomization design is clustered randomization. In this 
procedure, the randomization is not conducted at the level of an individual, but at the level of groups of 
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individuals: entire groups (or “clusters”) of people are assigned to either treatment or control. This is par-
ticularly useful for situations in which it can be expected that the treatment will have spillover effects on 
others in the same group. For example, when testing the effect of a new textbook, random assignment at 
the student level may not be possible, as the teacher will be teaching from the same book to the entire class. 
The assignment should then be done at the class level. Another example could be a tax authority that wants 
to test a new communication strategy towards small firms. They might worry that tax accountants, which 
work for several firms, could share information across the firms they work for. To remedy this, the ran-
domized assignment could be done at the accountant level, such that firms that share the same accountant 
would either all be in the treatment group or all in the control group.  
It is not necessary for both groups to be the same size. However, it is important to verify that the 
groups are balanced with respect to the main outcome variables of interest. That is, the average character-
istics (e.g., average firm revenue, industry composition, or percent of women) are not significantly different 
between the treatment and the control group. In the academic literature, experimental studies therefore usu-
ally include a balance table that shows that the main characteristics are similar across the two groups.  
The fourth step in a randomized evaluation should – whenever possible – be a pilot phase of the 
planned intervention. A small-scale pilot implementation of the program to be evaluated can provide enor-
mous benefits for the preparation of the large-scale intervention. In practice, the lessons learned from the 
pilot often make the difference between a successful, informative randomized study and an unsuccessful 
one. Pilots allow researchers and policymakers to learn about unforeseen challenges at a small scale, when 
they can still be remedied, and avoid unexpected problems later. This applies both to the implementation 
of the program itself, as well as the data collection process, the internal communication in the public agency 
about the intervention, etc. This logic of piloting and testing the intervention before conducting the large-
scale program evaluation is also consistent with practices used in Silicon Valley style technology start-up 
environments, where it is often known as the “Lean Startup” approach (Ries 2011).  
Finally, the implementation of the program or policy to be evaluated is carried out. The most im-
portant aspect of this process is to make sure that there is no difference between the treatment and control 
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group except the application of the program. Sometimes, well-meaning officials misunderstand the idea of 
the control group and think that all other interventions towards the control groups should also be halted 
until the study ends. However, this would amount to treating the control group differently from the treat-
ment group. For instance, imagine a tax authority wants to test a new communication strategy by sending 
specific letter messages to a randomly selected group of taxpayers and comparing their behavior to a control 
group. If officials now decided to halt all auditing activities in the control group but continue to apply such 
audits to the treatment group (or vice versa), the validity of the study would be lost. In this case, the two 
groups would not only differ in terms of receiving the treatment, but also in terms of their risk of being 
audited. When looking at the final difference between the two groups, it would be impossible to establish 
whether the difference stems from the treatment or from the effects of the audits.  
During the implementation, it is also important to make sure that the random assignment of indi-
viduals to each group is respected and that participants are not moved from one group to another. In the 
event that the randomization is not respected in the implementation process, it is still possible to conduct a 
valid impact evaluation, as long as researchers have precise information about who ended up receiving the 
treatment and who did not. In this case, it is possible to use the “Intent-to-Treat” methodology and use 
instrumental variables to measure the “Treatment-on-the-Treated” effect. This approach could, for example, 
be used if some letters sent to taxpayers were not received due to incorrect addresses (as done in Pomeranz 
2015). It is very important that even if this happens, the original random assignment is used when conduct-
ing the impact evaluation; those that were assigned to the treatment have to be compared to those assigned 
to be in the control group. It is never valid to compare those who were in fact treated with those that were 
meant to be treated, but ultimately did not participate in the program, because these two groups will not be 
comparable. In our example, taxpayers for whom the tax authority has invalid addresses are likely to be 
systematically different in many aspects from those with valid addresses. 
 
2.2 Experiences of randomized evaluations in public economics 
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Recent years have seen a strong increase in the use of randomized field experiments to study many 
different areas of public policy. One such area is tax administration. A pioneering collaboration of this 
nature was undertaken by Coleman (1996),	Blumenthal, Christian and Slemrod (2001), and Slemrod, Blu-
menthal and Christian (2001) undertook a pioneering collaboration of this nature with the tax authority of 
Minnesota in the mid-1990s. Many academics have followed their example, and a growing number of tax 
authorities are collaborating with academics. Randomized experiments have since been conducted by tax 
authorities in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Israel, Mexico, 
Peru, Switzerland, USA, Venezuela (Hallsworth 2014), and plans for such projects are under way in Kenya, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Uganda, and other countries around the world.  
One frequently used type of intervention consists of sending letter messages to taxpayers in order 
to test different hypotheses about taxpayer behavior. The most frequently used outcome measures relate to 
the amount of taxes paid, since tax administrations already have access to this data; it is the first order of 
concern for tax administrations. A growing number of recent studies have measured the impact of random-
ized letters or text messages on the behavior of individual taxpayers (Coleman 1996; Blumenthal, Christian 
and Slemrod 2001; Slemrod, Blumenthal and Chrisitan 2001; Torgler 2004, 2013; Wenzel 2005, 2006; 
OECD 2010; Kleven et al. 2011; Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler 2013; Haynes et al. 2013; Dwenger et al. 
2014; Hallsworth et al. 2014; Bhargava and Manoli 2015), property owners (Wenzel and Taylor 2004; Del 
Carpio 2013; Castro and Scartascini 2015), or firms (Hasseldine et al. 2007; Iyer, Recker and Sanders 2010; 
Ariel 2012; Harju, Kosonen and Ropponen 2013; Ortega and Sanguinetti 2013; Bhargava and Manoli 2015; 
Pomeranz 2015). Some letters have tested behavioral responses to either audit threats or motivational mes-
sages. Others have evaluated the importance of the wording, such as the simplicity and clarity of the mes-
sage (Bhargava and Manoli 2015). Other studies include additional measures such as face-to-face visits 
(Gangl et al. 2014). For an excellent overview on the use of randomized field experiments to increase tax 
compliance, see Hallsworth (2014).  
In collaboration with the tax authority in Chile, we employed this type of randomized letter message 
experiment for a particularly policy-relevant aspect of tax administration: risk indicators that predict what 
12 
types of taxpayers are more likely to react to an increase in the audit probability (Pomeranz, Marshall and 
Castellon 2014). Many tax authorities use such risk indicators to select which taxpayers will be audited. 
However, inputs into such risk indicators often suffer from a self-fulfilling circle problem. Information 
about high evasion is typically found through audits. This information is therefore more available from 
types of taxpayers that were already audited more frequently in the past. The risk indicators therefore end 
up having a self-referential problem, in which types of taxpayers that were audited more in the past are 
more prone to be found as high risk in the future. We developed a method that gets around this problem, 
by using the response to randomized deterrence letter messages as inputs into the risk indicator. Tax au-
thorities can apply this method to target audit activities towards categories of taxpayers that can be expected 
to have a particularly strong response.  
In addition to analyzing the impacts of different communication and auditing strategies, random-
ized studies can also be used to study behavioral responses of taxpayers to the tax structure itself. In col-
laboration with the Chilean tax authority, we evaluated the role of third-party information for value added 
tax (VAT) compliance (Pomeranz 2015). The results show that the VAT can indeed have important “self-
enforcing” properties. However, these properties are only activated if the audit probability is high enough 
that taxpayers take the risk of detection seriously. In this case, the third-party information can lead to im-
portant spillover effects that multiply the effectiveness of tax enforcement measures. 
Taxation is by no means the only area of public economics in which randomized experiments play 
a growing role. Public procurement is another area of growth for these types of studies. Projects are cur-
rently under way in procurement agencies in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia among others. One of the few 
randomized studies in this area that has already been completed is Litschig and Zamboni (2013). They 
analyze whether a randomized increase in the audit risk deters corruption and waste in local public procure-
ment in Brazil. The results show that a twenty percentage point increase in the audit risk reduces the inci-
dence of corruption and mismanagement of local procurement by seventeen percentage points.   
Governments may also want to study many other aspects related to the effectiveness of government 
spending. For example, in the area of savings, randomized evaluations in very different settings found (by 
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randomly varying the savings interest rate) that subsidizing interests rates to encourage the poor is not very 
effective, but that follow-up and feedback messages may be more impactful (Karlan et al. 2010; Karlan and 
Zinman 2014; Kast, Meier and Pomeranz 2014). This suggests that the barriers to savings may be more 
behavioral than financial, so that inexpensive interventions such as setting defaults (Madrian and Shea 
2001; Choi et al. 2002) or sending follow-up messages can be highly effective. This can have important 
impacts for those affected. Studies that provided randomly selected low-income individuals access to free 
savings accounts found that they can help the poor cope with economic shocks (Kast and Pomeranz 2014), 
increase monetary assets (Prina 2015), and increase investments in health and education (Dupas and Rob-
inson 2013; Prina 2015).  
There is also a large literature using randomized evaluations in the areas of public health, education, 
etc. Providing an overview on these areas goes beyond the scope of this paper. The website of the Abdul 
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, http://www.povertyactionlab.org, provides a list of such evaluations con-
ducted by its affiliates. 
 
2.3 Summary on randomized evaluations 
Randomized evaluations allow estimating the effect of a program or policy on the behavior of those 
affected by it. The fact that participants are randomly assigned to treatment makes it possible to measure 
the effect by simply comparing the outcomes of those assigned to the treatment group and those assigned 
to the control group (also called “comparison group”). The counterfactual for the treatment group is repre-
sented by the control group. Members of the treatment and comparison group are selected randomly before 
the start of the program, among a group of potential participants. Estimates obtained through randomized 
evaluations have extremely high internal validity. They require very few additional assumptions to be valid. 
For these reasons, randomized evaluations are often referred to as the “gold standard” in impact evaluations. 
The key assumption of this method is that the randomization process is executed correctly. If that is the 
case, the treatment and comparison groups are in expectation statistically identical along both observable 
and unobservable characteristics. In addition, it is important that no other treatment is applied to only one 
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group and not the other. One practical drawback is that the random assignment has to be done before the 
program is implemented, and as a result, it is not possible to carry out retrospective randomized evaluations. 
In addition, in certain cases, random assignment to a particular treatment may not be practically, politically, 
or ethically feasible.  
The following sections describe other evaluation methods that try to construct an approximation of 
the counterfactual in circumstances where randomization is not possible. The validity of each method will 
depend on how similar the treatment group is to the control group.  
 
3. Simple Difference: Comparing the Treated to the Untreated 
The simple difference is one of the most frequently used methods employed to describe impacts. 
However, in many circumstances, its application will not provide correct, unbiased results. This section 
describes how simple differences work and what assumptions need to hold for them to be valid. Under-
standing the limits of simple differences will also further illustrate the benefits of having a valid comparison 
group in order to be able to obtain unbiased impact evaluations.  
The simple differences methodology is straightforward: comparing the group that received the pro-
gram with another that did not. The comparison group in this case corresponds to people or entities that did 
not participate in the program. That is, the assumption is that those who did not participate represent a valid 
counterfactual of what would have happened to those who received the program, had they not received the 
program. Unfortunately, in many cases, this assumption is not realistic. In many programs, there is a selec-
tion process that determines who receives the treatment. For example, consider an audit program in which 
only taxpayers identified as high risk are selected. This assignment is not random and introduces selection 
bias. In other cases, anyone can participate in a treatment, but people self-select if they want to participate. 
There is likely to be a difference between those who did or did not participate, for example, in terms of their 
motivation or their needs. 
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To illustrate this situation with a concrete example, suppose someone wants to measure the impact 
of a program that offers free tutoring for children who have difficulty in school. This was the case in the 
study by Banerjee et al. (2007), which evaluated the effect of offering separate classes to the weakest stu-
dents. In these remedial classes, young women tutored students (so-called Balsakhi) in basic reading, writ-
ing, and math to help them catch up with their peers.  If this study simply compared the grades of children 
that received help from a tutor with those that did not, the results would be misleading. It is very well 
possible that the children with tutors would be found to have lower grades than those without tutors. How-
ever, concluding, based on this observation, that the tutors hurt the academic achievement of the children 
would likely be erroneous. In this program, children who had fallen behind were selected for the remedial 
classes. So children who had lower grades were more likely to receive the help of a tutor. This introduces 
a selection bias. In this case, the selection bias leads to an underestimate of the impact. Because the treated 
group had lower grades to begin with, when comparing those that receive the help of a tutor to those who 
do not, it may appear that the tutoring had a negative effect on grades.  
Despite the potential serious concerns with selection bias, simple differences are often popular be-
cause they can be conducted in a retrospective manner, even after the program has been concluded, and 
they do not require a lot of data (for example, no data on the situation of the participants prior to the program 
start). Therefore, newspapers and government documents frequently report such differences as evidence for 
the benefit (or lack of benefit) of certain programs. Based on the discussion above, such statements have to 
be treated with much caution.  
 
3.1 Summary on simple differences 
Analysis based on simple differences measure the impact by comparing the post-treatment situation 
of those that participated in a program with a comparison group that did not. The counterfactual is repre-
sented by those in the comparison group.  The key assumption of this method is that those in the comparison 
group are identical to those that participated in the program, except for the effects of the program. A key 
advantage, and reason for its frequent use, is that this method does not require data on the situation prior to 
16 
the treatment. However, a big drawback is that if the treated and comparison groups are different in any 
way prior to the program, the method may be biased and may under- or overestimate the real impact of a 
policy; that is, selection bias is introduced into the estimation. 
 
4. Pre- vs. Post-Treatment Comparison 
A pre-post comparison is a particular type of simple difference evaluation. Instead of using another 
group as a control group, the same group of people is compared before and after participating in the pro-
gram. Therefore, a pre-post evaluation measures change over time. The impact is measured as the difference 
between outcomes of interest before and after an intervention. The pre-post analysis is frequently used in 
evaluating programs.  In many cases, when there is data on outcomes prior to the intervention, this type of 
retrospective analysis seems convenient, particularly because it does not require information on people who 
did not participate in the program.  
In the aforementioned example of a tutoring program, a pre-post evaluation would allow taking 
into account the initial grades of the students. However, the important question to assess the validity of a 
pre-post evaluation is the following: is the situation of the participants before the start of the program a 
good representation of the counterfactual? In other words, is it correct to assume that without the program, 
during this period, there would have been no change in the results of the treated group? Figure 2 represents 
this issue graphically. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
In the free tutoring program example, it is very unlikely that the children would not have improved 
their learning at all over time, even in the absence of a tutor. However, a simple pre-post evaluation would 
assume that all improvements over the time span of the program are due to the program. So even the learn-
ing resulting from the normal development of the children would be attributed to the tutoring program. In 
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other words, the estimates would have a positive bias: they would overestimate the true effect of the pro-
gram.  
In addition to such overall time trends, the results of a pre-post analysis can also be biased due to 
other factors that change the outcome over time but are not related to the program. For example, if there is 
an economic crisis during the implementation period of an auditing program, tax behavior may change 
independently of the auditing program. It is then not possible to know if the change over time is due to the 
crisis, the policy, or a combination of both. That is, the evaluation may be affected by omitted variable bias.  
 
4.1 Experiences of pre-post comparison evaluations in public economics 
While a simple pre-post comparison will often lead to biased results, there are certain settings in 
which a pre-post analysis can yield credible estimates, i.e., settings in which the pre-treatment situation 
provides a valid counter-factual for the post-treatment situation. One such example is Carrillo, Pomeranz 
and Singhal (2014). In this study, we evaluate a program by the Ecuadorian tax authority. The program 
focused on firms whose declared revenue was much lower than information about the firms’ revenue that 
the tax authority obtained from third-party sources. Several years after the corresponding tax filings, the 
tax authority sent letters to firms with a particularly large discrepancy, asking them to amend their declara-
tion. This lead to an immediate spike in the amendment rate, while firms that did not receive a letter were 
very unlikely to make any amendments such a long time after the original filing. In this case, a valid coun-
terfactual for the new amount declared in the amendment is the amount declared in the original tax filing. 
The underlying assumption in this case is that in the absence of the letter, these firms would not have filed 
an amendment at this time. The study found that when firms were notified about detected revenue discrep-
ancies, they increased reported revenues – but also reported costs, leading to only minor increases in tax 
collection. 
 
4.2 Summary on pre-post comparison 
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Pre-post analysis measures the change in outcomes over time for participants of a program. It com-
pares the situation before and after a treatment. The counterfactual is represented by the same participants, 
but prior to the program. The key assumption of this method is that the program is the only factor that 
influenced a change in outcomes over that time period. Without the program, the outcomes would have 
remained the same. This is, in reality, only rarely the case. Many factors that vary over time can affect an 
outcome, which contradicts the key assumption made above. In particular, the pre-post comparison does 
not control for general time trends or other things that happen over the study period that are unrelated to 
the program but affect the outcomes. The benefit of this method is that it does not require information on 
people that did not participate in the program. This is why it is often used by the media and in policy 
communications. 
 
5. Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
A difference-in-differences evaluation combines the two previous methods (simple difference and 
pre-post) to take into account both the differences between the two groups and changes over time. The 
effect is calculated by measuring the change over time for the treated group and the comparison group and 
then taking the difference between these two differences (hence the name “difference-in-differences”). 
  
[Table 1] 
 
Table 1 shows a numerical illustration of a difference-in-differences estimation for the tutoring 
example. It displays the average grades of the children with and without the tutoring program, before and 
after the program (on a scale of zero to a hundred). As we can see, the treated group that receives a tutor 
has lower grades than the untreated group, both before and after the treatment. So a simple difference would 
have introduced a negative bias into the analysis. The numbers also illustrate that the grades of both groups 
improved over time. So a simple pre-post analysis would have introduced a positive bias. When we take 
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the difference between the two differences, we see that the grades of those who received a tutor improved 
by 6.82 points more than the grades of those who did not receive a tutor.  
For those familiar with regression analysis: In notation of multivariate regressions, the difference-
in-differences estimator is represented by the interaction term between the treatment group and the post-
treatment period.  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ	 ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଶ	݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߚଷ	 ௜ܶ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧, 
where ௜ܻ௧ represents the variable of interest for individual i in period t, ௜ܶ is a binary variable indi-
cating whether or not individual i participated in the program, and ݌݋ݏݐ௧ is a binary variable indicating the 
period following the program. ߚଷ	is the difference-in-differences estimator and ߳ ௜௧	represents the error term. 
In essence, the difference-in-differences estimation uses the change over time for the untreated 
group as the counterfactual for the change over time of the treated group. That is, it controls for all the 
characteristics that do not change over time (both observable and unobservable) and for all the changes 
over time that affect the treated and untreated group in the same manner.  
The key assumption is that without the program, the change over time would have been the same 
in both groups. This is often referred to as the common or parallel trend assumption. If in the absence of 
the program, the treated group would have had a different trend over time than the comparison group, this 
assumption is violated (see Meyer (1995) for a discussion of the parallel trend assumption). These concepts 
are graphically illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
In the case of the student tutoring example, the assumption implies that without the additional help, 
the children with a tutor and those without one would have improved their scholarly achievements at the 
same rate. It is not obvious that this is the case here. Even without the program, the children who were 
originally behind – and were, therefore, more likely to receive a tutor – might have improved more than the 
other children, given that they had more room to improve. On the other hand, since these children had a 
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harder time learning, it is also possible that they would have fallen even further behind. The difference-in-
differences estimate could in this case be biased upward or downward. This is not possible to assess from 
the data since we do not know how much the children with a tutor would have improved without a tutor. 
That is, we cannot test the parallel trend assumption.  
In recent studies, researchers have increasingly tried to look at longer time series to see whether 
the treatment and control groups evolved in parallel before the start of the treatment. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4. It shows a case in which the treatment group and control group have a parallel trend prior to the 
treatment. After the treatment starts, the two groups diverge. The finding of a parallel trend before and a 
difference after treatment gives credibility to the conclusion that the treatment caused the effect. 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
5.1 Experiences of difference-in-differences in public economics 
 Duflo (2001) provides a great illustration of the application of difference-in-differences estimation 
in practice. The paper takes advantage of variation in school construction in Indonesia across regions and 
time to measure the impact of school construction on school attendance. It illustrates well how many 
assumptions need to be taken into account when conducting this type of estimation in a reliable manner.  
On the topic of tax administration, Naritomi (2015) uses a difference-in-differences approach to 
study the effectiveness of incentives for final consumers to ask firms for a receipt. She compares declared 
revenues of retail versus wholesale firms, before and after the policy change. Providing consumers with a 
financial incentive to ask for a receipt proves to be effective in boosting firms’ declared sales and taxes. 
Incentives in the form of lotteries seem to be particularly effective, suggesting that consumers might be 
affected by behavioral biases. These behavioral biases make incentives in the form of lotteries more cost-
effective for the government. However, they also raise ethical questions as to whether it is legitimate for 
the government to exploit such biases. 
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Casaburi and Troiano (2015) study the electoral response to a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy 
in Italy using a difference-in-differences estimator. By comparing municipalities with more or less “inten-
sity” of the anti-tax evasion intervention before and after the program, they find that a higher intensity of 
the program lead to significantly higher re-election chances for the local mayor. There is also a large liter-
ature in taxation, particularly focusing on the US and other highly developed countries, using difference-
in-differences estimation to analyze the impacts of tax changes on individual behavior, such as labor supply 
and on firm behavior, such as investment. Reviewing this literature is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 Bandiera et al. (2009) apply a version of difference-in-differences estimation to study the behavior 
of public officials in public procurement processes. They exploit a natural experiment in Italy’s public 
procurement system to look at the determinants of waste and inefficiencies in the procurement process. 
Public entities in Italy can procure goods either directly from providers or from a central platform, where 
goods are available at pre-negotiated conditions. The study exploits the fact that certain goods were only 
available on the central platform at certain times. By comparing the price of procured goods during times 
when goods were available on the central platform to times when they were not, the authors can disentangle 
the mechanism through which waste happens. The availability of products on the central platform has sig-
nificant effects on procurement behavior and prices. The results show that this variation in prices is mostly 
due to passive behavior by the public agents rather than active benefit-seeking, and the effect varies with 
different governance structures.   
A recent study by Lewis-Faupel et al. (2014) also uses difference-in-differences estimation to study 
public procurement. The study exploits regional and time variation in the adoption of electronic procure-
ment systems across India and Indonesia to test the effect of e-procurement on the cost and quality of 
infrastructure provision. The fact that both countries rolled out the treatment gradually by region allowed 
the authors to carry out a difference-in-differences strategy, comparing states that were treated first with 
those that followed later. They find no effect on the prices paid by the government, but significant improve-
ment in quality.  
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5.2 Summary difference-in-differences analysis 
Difference-in-differences analysis compares the change in outcomes over time of those that partic-
ipated in the program to the change over time of those that did not. The change for those who do not 
participate in the program represents the counterfactual of the change for those that did participate in the 
program. The key assumption of this method is the assumption of common trends. It assumes that without 
the program, both groups would have had identical trajectories over time. The benefit of this method is that 
it controls for all the characteristics that do not change over time (both observable and unobservable) and 
for all the changes over time that affect the treated and untreated group in the same manner. The drawback 
is that it is typically impossible to assess whether the two groups would have developed in the same way in 
the absence of the program. If this is not the case, the analysis will be biased.  When longer time series of 
date are available, the assumption can be tested to some degree by showing that over a long pre-treatment 
period, the two groups had the same changes over time, and only when the treatment started did the time 
trends of the two groups diverge.  
 
6. Matching Procedures and Propensity Scores 
Matching procedures are based on the original objective of constructing a representation of the 
counterfactual and attempting to create a control group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group. 
There are several matching methods. In the basic case, each individual in the treated group is matched to 
an individual from the untreated group with the same observable characteristics. The comparison group is 
then composed of these matched individuals. To estimate the impact of a program, the method compares 
the outcomes between the treatment group and the matched comparison group. Given that both groups have 
the same observable characteristics before the program, it is expected that any difference after the program 
will be due to having been exposed to the program. 
We can look at this process in the case of the tutoring program example. It is possible to find 
children who did not sign up for the program but had the same grades on average as children who received 
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the help of a tutor before the intervention. This way, a comparison group can be created with non-treated 
students that have the same observable characteristics as the treated children.  
 
[Figure 5] 
 
Figure 5 shows the matching process for the tutoring example with three characteristics: age, pre-
test score, and gender. Students in the treatment group are matched to children who did not receive a tutor. 
The matched students from the non-treated list then serve as the comparison group. The process of finding 
similar peers ensures that the two groups are identical along the observable characteristics that are consid-
ered for the match.  
The key assumption, in this case, is that those who do not participate are, on average, identical to 
their matched peers, except for having participated in the program. The challenge is that matching can never 
control for unobserved variables. In the tutoring program example, there is a non-random reason that two 
children with the same grades received a different treatment. Maybe the teacher knew that some students 
had more potential than others, or maybe some students had more proactive parents who were pushing for 
their child to receive a tutor. If there are such differences that the available data cannot measure, the selec-
tion bias problem arises again, even though on observed characteristics, the two matched groups are iden-
tical. It is likely, for example, that in the absence of the tutoring program, children with more proactive 
parents would have improved more than their classmates with the same grades. 
In this context, the benefits of randomized treatment assignment become apparent. Randomized 
assignment ensures that the treatment and comparison groups are similar not only along observable but also 
along unobserved characteristics.  
The larger the number of characteristics that are included in the matching, the harder it is to use 
one-to-one matching. With many observed characteristics, it may be impossible to find an identical student 
that did not have a tutor. For these reasons “Propensity Score Matching” (PSM) was developed. PSM 
allows matching with many characteristics. Based on the observable characteristics of individuals, their 
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propensity (or probability) of being in the treated group is estimated. In this way, the number of character-
istics is reduced to a single score, ranging from zero to one, which predicts the probability of participating 
in the program. In effect, the propensity score is a weighted average of the included characteristics. The 
matching is then done between individuals that have the same score: that is, the same likelihood of partici-
pating in the program. For a detailed guide for implementing matching techniques see Imbens (2015).  
 
6.1 Experiences of matching in public economics 
One of the earliest and most well-known examples of the propensity score matching technique was 
conducted by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) to analyze the impact of a labor training program on income.  
Comparing the propensity score method to other approaches, they find that the propensity score estimate 
was, in this case, much closer to the results of the randomized experiment than many of the other non-
experimental estimates. In this context, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that what matters most is includ-
ing the right covariates, not the type of matching methodology. In the setting studied by Dehejia and Wahba, 
including the 2-year lagged pre-treatment income turned out to be decisive.  
 
6.2 Summary of matching 
Matching methods compare outcomes of treated individuals with those of similar individuals that 
were not treated. In exact matching, participants are matched with individuals that are identical along se-
lected characteristics but that did not participate in the treatment. In propensity score matching, participants 
are compared to individuals that had the same probability of participating in the program according to their 
observable characteristics but did not participate. The key assumption of this method is that those who 
participate in the program are, on average, identical to their matched peers, except for having participated 
in the program. It assumes that when people or entities are matched on observable characteristics, they will 
also be comparable along unobserved dimensions.  The benefit of this method is that it controls for observed 
characteristics. The drawback is that it is typically impossible to rule out that there are not also other, un-
observed characteristics that differ between the groups, which would bias the impact estimation. Knowing 
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the likelihood that unobservable characteristics will be important in a given context requires understanding 
the mechanism by which the participants were selected into the program and knowing what factors other 
than the program may affect the outcome.  
 
7. Regression Discontinuity Design 
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a methodology that allows making causal conclusions 
that are nearly as reliable as the randomized control trial. It can only be applied in cases where a program 
or policy has a specific threshold that determines who is eligible to participate. A RDD uses the fact that 
the individuals or entities just barely above the threshold are basically identical to individuals just below. 
Under certain assumptions, it is therefore possible to measure the treatment effect in the difference between 
the outcomes of the individuals just below the threshold – who are therefore not eligible – and the outcomes 
of those just above – who are therefore eligible.  
A good illustrative example is a case in which test scores determine whether a student gets admitted 
to a prestigious college. Imagine that the threshold for being admitted is 924 out of 1,000 possible points. 
Students who scored 923 points are almost indistinguishable from students with 924 points, but the latter 
are admitted and the former are not. If the students with 924 or 925 points end up earning much more than 
the students with 922 or 923 points, this difference may be the result of attending the prestigious college. 
For an example in tax administration, assume that a tax authority sends a notification letter to all 
firms whose declared tax filings indicate a large discrepancy between their self-reported revenue and infor-
mation about their revenue from third party sources. The tax authority, therefore, suspects these firms of 
cheating. However, the tax authority does not want to send out too many notifications and decides to send 
notifications to all firms with discrepancies that are greater than 1,000 dollars. That is, whether a firm 
receives a notification is determined by whether it has more or less than 1,000 dollars in discrepancies. The 
regression discontinuity design will then compare firms that had discrepancies a bit smaller than 1,000 
dollars to firms that had discrepancies just a bit larger than this cut-off.   
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Figure 6 displays this example of a regression discontinuity evaluation. The solid line represents 
the relationship between the size of the discrepancy and the declared tax amount: firms with larger discrep-
ancies also tend to declare more tax. This is likely due to the fact that they are larger in size. Taxpayers 
above the cutoff value (in our example 1,000 dollars in discrepancies) are included in the treatment, i.e., 
they receive a notification. Under certain assumptions, the sharp increase in the amount of declared taxes 
above the cutoff can then be attributed to the notification.  
 
[Figure 6] 
 
The key assumption in a regression discontinuity design is that the entities or individuals just below 
the cutoff are not systematically different from those just above. This assumption can be violated, for ex-
ample, if there is strategic manipulation around the threshold. If, for instance, it is known prior to the mail-
ing of the notifications that they will be sent to all firms with more than 1,000 dollars in discrepancy, then 
firms might be able to manipulate their discrepancy to be just below that cut-off. Those who do so may be 
particularly shrewd, well-informed, or otherwise different than those who do not. In that case, there will be 
a difference between the firms just below the threshold and those just above.  
Such a difference around the threshold introduces selection bias. The good news is that the assump-
tion that there is no such behavior around the threshold can be tested. If a manipulation occurred, there 
would be a higher concentration of firms (bunching) just below the threshold. This can be verified. In the 
same manner, it is possible to verify that there are no differences in the key characteristics between the 
firms just above or below the threshold. 
Finally, a regression discontinuity design also requires that no other programs or policies be applied 
to the same threshold. For example, if the firms with discrepancies greater than 1,000 dollars are also visited 
by an auditor, it would not be possible to distinguish the impact of that visit from the impact of the notifi-
cation. Knowing whether other things change at the same threshold requires good knowledge of the insti-
tutional details and the context in which the intervention takes place.  
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Both problems, the behavioral response to the threshold and the possibility that other policies are 
applied to the same threshold, are more frequent when the cutoff is known by everyone. Therefore, optimal 
thresholds for the use of this methodology are often secret or defined only after the score for each individual 
or entity has already been determined. 
One limit of RDDs is that the estimation can only be applied to observations around the cutoff. It 
is not possible to know what the impact was for firms with discrepancies much larger than 1,000 dollars, 
or what it would have been for firms with much smaller discrepancies. How informative the insights of the 
RDD are will therefore depend on the context of the policy and on the extent to which we think that the 
program affects people or entities that are far away from the threshold differently. 
 
7.1 Experiences of regression discontinuity in public economics 
RDDs are of particular interest for impact evaluations in the domain of public economics since 
many policies related to public economics are organized around cut-offs. In tax administration, for instance, 
there are many policies that are applied according to some cutoff, and frequently the administrative data 
required for the analysis already exists. Similarly, audit rules for public procurement, tax evasion, labor 
laws, etc., often use scoring rules with a cut-off, above which entities have a higher risk of being audited.  
In an ongoing study, we apply this method to procurement practices in Chile (Gerardino, Litschig 
and Pomeranz 2015). In collaboration with the national comptroller agency “Contraloría,” we exploit a 
scoring rule that creates higher audit probabilities for public entities above certain thresholds. The study 
then analyzes the impacts of audits on the public procurement process by comparing public entities that fell 
just below the cutoff to entities that were just above.  
 
7.2 Summary of regression discontinuity designs 
RDDs compare the outcomes of individuals or entities that are just below a threshold that qualifies 
them for the treatment with the results of those that are just above this threshold (or cut-off). Outcomes of 
individuals or entities that fall just below the threshold represent the counterfactual of the individuals who 
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fall just above. The key assumption is that the individuals just above the threshold are otherwise almost 
identical to those who fall just below. This implies that there is no manipulation around the threshold and 
that no other policies are applied based on the same cutoff.  This is more likely to be the case when the 
exact threshold is not known ex-ante. RDDs can produce very reliable impact estimations. In public admin-
istration, there are many policies that are applied according to some cutoff, and frequently the administrative 
data required for the analysis already exists. The key weakness of RDDs is that the effect can only be 
estimated for individuals or entities that are close to the cutoff.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Rigorous impact evaluations have experienced a large expansion in recent years, both in their meth-
odological developments and in their practical applications. Public agencies interested in affecting their 
citizens to encourage behaviors such as tax compliance, savings or rule following, are increasingly testing 
the effectiveness of public policies to achieve these goals. This paper aims to provide an introductory over-
view for those interested in conducting such evaluations in a reliable way. Among the methods covered, 
randomized evaluations and regression discontinuity designs provide the most rigorous, causally valid es-
timates. If these methods are not available, difference-in-differences estimation or matching methods may 
provide an alternative. These latter methods are more likely to suffer from selection bias or omitted variable 
bias and, therefore, have to be applied with more caution. Finally, simple differences and pre-post analysis, 
while being frequently applied in practice by the media or policymakers due to their conceptual simplicity, 
are also the most prone to estimation biases and are therefore generally the least reliable of the methods 
described in this paper.  
Apart from the particular method that is chosen, the quality of the evaluation will depend to a large 
degree on two factors: the quality of the execution of the analysis and detailed knowledge of the context of 
the program that is being evaluated. This is why the increasing number of collaborations between academics 
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and practitioners hold so much promise. Combining the methodological knowledge of highly trained aca-
demics with the expertise of public officials about the practical context has huge potential to grow our 
understanding of both public finance and behavioral economics. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Estimating Difference-in-Differences 
 
 Result before the 
program 
Result after the 
program 
Difference 
over time 
Treated group 24.80 51.22 26.42 
Untreated group 36.67 56.27 19.60 
Difference-in-differences estimate 6.82 
 
This table provides a numerical example a difference-in-differences estimation. The numbers are 
from the tutoring example and represent grades of the children with and without the tutoring 
program, before and after the program. Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Counterfactual 
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This figure represents the fundamental challenge of impact evaluations, which seek to measure the differ-
ence between the outcome that occurred (shown in light/yellow dots) and a counterfactual that is never 
observed (shown with dark/blue dots). Impact evaluation techniques therefore – implicitly or explicitly – 
attempt to construct an estimation of the counterfactual in order to measure the impact. This is often done 
through the use of a control group. Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2015). 
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Figure 2. Counterfactual Assumption for Pre-Post: No Change in the Absence of Treatment 
 
In a pre-post impact evaluation, the key assumption is that in the absence of the treatment, there 
would have been no change in the outcome variable. If this is the case, the pre-treatment situation 
represents a valid counterfactual for the post-treatment situation. Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Pov-
erty Action Lab (2015). 
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Figure 3. Counterfactual Assumption in Difference-in-Differences Analysis: Parallel Trends 
 
This figure displays the logic and assumptions underlying the difference-in-differences analysis. The counterfactual of 
the change over time for those that did participate in the program is the change for those that did not participate (repre-
sented by the dashed line). The key assumption is therefore that in the absence of the treatment, the two groups would 
have followed the same trend over time. If this is true, the treatment effect can be measured as the difference between 
the differences over time. See also Table 1. Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2015). 
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Figure 4. Checking for Parallel Trends 
 
This figure demonstrates how time series data can allow us to check for parallel trends between 
the treatment group and the control group prior to the start of the treatment. As the figure shows, 
prior to the treatment, the two groups have a parallel trend. This gives credibility to the assumption 
that in the absence of treatment, they would have continued on a parallel trend, which is required 
for the difference-in-differences analysis to be valid. The two groups diverge only after treatment, 
giving credibility to the conclusion that the treatment led to this effect.  
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Figure 5. Matching Process in the Tutor Example 
 
This is an example of a direct matching process for the tutoring example. It matches students in the treatment group 
to students who did not receive a tutor. Matching is done along three observable dimensions: age, pre-test-score, 
and gender. The matched students from the non-treated list then serve as the comparison group. Source: Abdul Latif 
Jameel Poverty Action Lab (2015). 
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Figure 6. Illustration of a Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
This figure provides a graphical representation of a RDD. Individuals or entities above a cer-
tain cutoff of the selection variable are included in the treatment, and those below the cutoff 
are not. That is, there is a discontinuity along the selection variable, above which the treatment 
is applied. If the required assumptions for a RDD are met, the sharp increase in the outcome 
variable at the cutoff can be attributed to the treatment. Source: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab (2015).  
 
